Bargain like a Somali
像索马里海盗一样讨价还价
How to negotiate with pirates in the Horn of Africa
咋在非洲的霍恩和海盗们谈判呢？
Nov 24th 2012 | from the print edition of The Economist
译者：大G兽
Quick, name your price
快，报价
SEIZURES of ships by pirates off the coast of Somalia may be down in recent months, but the interest of social scientists and economists in the country is undiminished. Because the place has been so stateless for so long, it provides a testing ground for theories about how people behave in the absence of meddlesome government. One such question is how two parties bargain when neither has good information available. Negotiations between shipowners and Somali pirates fit that description well.
近来，被索马里海盗捕获的船只越来越少啦，但是社会科学家和经济学家对其的兴趣却木有降低。毕竟这地儿政府缺位太久啦，社科学家们可以在这里测试木有爱管闲事的政府的情况下让他们的理论会咋表现。其中一个试题是，信息不充分的情况下，两团体会怎么讨价还价。而索马里海盗合船主之间就符合这种情况。
Economists have been interested in the free-market ways of pirates for a while. Last year a team of three published a paper drawing on data from more than 10,000 negotiations that took place from 1575 to 1739 between North African pirates on one side and monks acting for Spanish families on the other. They found that the Spanish managed to pay lower ransoms by dragging talks out. Data on the activities of present-day pirates in Somalia are more, well, patchy. To fill the gap, the authors of a new paper gathered data from pirate negotiators.
有一段时间经济学家们对出于自由市场环境下的海盗感兴趣。上一年，一个三人小组发了一篇论文，基于发生自1575年到1739年北非海盗和西班牙家庭间超过10000起的谈判。他们发现西班牙人倾向于拖长谈判期限以降低赎金。而当代关于索马里海盗的数据则更多，更好，当然更零散。为了填补这些空白，一篇新论文的作者搜集了那些海盗谈判的数据。
They found that Somali pirates pretend to be more sophisticated than they are, whereas shipowners pretend to be poorer. Nowadays both sides have an interest in a speedy resolution, since a prolonged negotiation incurs costs. For the shipowner, the cargo spoils and the ship goes unused. For the pirates, the captured crew must be fed and the ship guarded. And pirates cannot last long without a resupply of qat, which is to them as rum is to Captain Jack Sparrow. Settle too quickly, though, and one side or other is likely to get a poor deal.
他们发现索马里海盗尝试装逼装作更加人情世故，而那些船主则装成一副穷逼的样子。今日，双方都想着咋速战速决，毕竟延长谈判花费更高。对船主而言，货物被糟蹋了，船被空置。对海盗而言，要喂着那群被捕获的船员，海的守着船。海盗脱离了qat的支持并不能撑很长时间，这对他们而言就像朗姆酒对杰克斯帕洛船长那么重要。解决的太快了，对其中一方而言总归会吃点亏。
Government intervention can create perverse incentives. Spain paid a ransom of $1.2m for a fishing boat, the Playa del Bakio, in 2008—more than twice the amount previously paid for a vessel of that type, setting a new floor price. Indeed, although the number of ships taken is down, the pirates have adjusted by charging more per release. There are also signs that they are moving inland, grabbing aid workers and other foreigners far from the guns of the US Navy.
而政府的介入则会触发些并不那么乐观的激励。西班牙为一艘名为Playa del Bakio的渔船支付了120万的赎金，而2008年为同样的船则支付了上述价格的两倍，设定了一个新的地板价。尽管被打劫的船只数目下降，海盗们则调高了单位船只的赎金来适应。同时他们也会向陆地进发拓展业务，打劫些目标工作人员与其他远离美国海军的外国佬。
from the print edition | Finance and economics
像索马里海盗一样讨价还价
How to negotiate with pirates in the Horn of Africa
咋在非洲的霍恩和海盗们谈判呢？
Nov 24th 2012 | from the print edition of The Economist
译者：大G兽
Quick, name your price
快，报价
SEIZURES of ships by pirates off the coast of Somalia may be down in recent months, but the interest of social scientists and economists in the country is undiminished. Because the place has been so stateless for so long, it provides a testing ground for theories about how people behave in the absence of meddlesome government. One such question is how two parties bargain when neither has good information available. Negotiations between shipowners and Somali pirates fit that description well.
近来，被索马里海盗捕获的船只越来越少啦，但是社会科学家和经济学家对其的兴趣却木有降低。毕竟这地儿政府缺位太久啦，社科学家们可以在这里测试木有爱管闲事的政府的情况下让他们的理论会咋表现。其中一个试题是，信息不充分的情况下，两团体会怎么讨价还价。而索马里海盗合船主之间就符合这种情况。
Economists have been interested in the free-market ways of pirates for a while. Last year a team of three published a paper drawing on data from more than 10,000 negotiations that took place from 1575 to 1739 between North African pirates on one side and monks acting for Spanish families on the other. They found that the Spanish managed to pay lower ransoms by dragging talks out. Data on the activities of present-day pirates in Somalia are more, well, patchy. To fill the gap, the authors of a new paper gathered data from pirate negotiators.
有一段时间经济学家们对出于自由市场环境下的海盗感兴趣。上一年，一个三人小组发了一篇论文，基于发生自1575年到1739年北非海盗和西班牙家庭间超过10000起的谈判。他们发现西班牙人倾向于拖长谈判期限以降低赎金。而当代关于索马里海盗的数据则更多，更好，当然更零散。为了填补这些空白，一篇新论文的作者搜集了那些海盗谈判的数据。
They found that Somali pirates pretend to be more sophisticated than they are, whereas shipowners pretend to be poorer. Nowadays both sides have an interest in a speedy resolution, since a prolonged negotiation incurs costs. For the shipowner, the cargo spoils and the ship goes unused. For the pirates, the captured crew must be fed and the ship guarded. And pirates cannot last long without a resupply of qat, which is to them as rum is to Captain Jack Sparrow. Settle too quickly, though, and one side or other is likely to get a poor deal.
他们发现索马里海盗尝试装逼装作更加人情世故，而那些船主则装成一副穷逼的样子。今日，双方都想着咋速战速决，毕竟延长谈判花费更高。对船主而言，货物被糟蹋了，船被空置。对海盗而言，要喂着那群被捕获的船员，海的守着船。海盗脱离了qat的支持并不能撑很长时间，这对他们而言就像朗姆酒对杰克斯帕洛船长那么重要。解决的太快了，对其中一方而言总归会吃点亏。
Government intervention can create perverse incentives. Spain paid a ransom of $1.2m for a fishing boat, the Playa del Bakio, in 2008—more than twice the amount previously paid for a vessel of that type, setting a new floor price. Indeed, although the number of ships taken is down, the pirates have adjusted by charging more per release. There are also signs that they are moving inland, grabbing aid workers and other foreigners far from the guns of the US Navy.
而政府的介入则会触发些并不那么乐观的激励。西班牙为一艘名为Playa del Bakio的渔船支付了120万的赎金，而2008年为同样的船则支付了上述价格的两倍，设定了一个新的地板价。尽管被打劫的船只数目下降，海盗们则调高了单位船只的赎金来适应。同时他们也会向陆地进发拓展业务，打劫些目标工作人员与其他远离美国海军的外国佬。
from the print edition | Finance and economics
